Revisiting Jinbao Place and Beijing's Luxury Retail District

Jinbao Street is a premier luxury shopping street in Beijing, like Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills. In its two-block stretch there are three 4 or 5-star hotels and Bentley, Ferrari, Maserati and Mercedes dealerships. In my return this time, I found an Aston-Martin dealership in the lobby of my hotel, The Regent.

Jinbao (translated as “golden treasure”) Street is the best-known destination for Beijing’s wealthiest shoppers.

Seven years ago, I reported on a struggling three-year-old, 40,000 square meter (430,000 square foot) luxury mall known as Jinbao Place which stood largely vacant on this otherwise busy street. Above the second floor in this seven-stories-above-grade mall, almost all the space was vacant. The seventh floor, the restaurant floor, had only a roast duck restaurant.

At that time, I thought the problem was that most luxury retailers had already saturated the Dongdan district that contains Jinbao Street and the famed Wangfujing pedestrian mall, anchored by the newly renovated Beijing APM mall, formerly known as the Sun Dong An plaza. There seemed to be an Omega watch store on almost every block.

What a difference seven years makes, though. I found the Jinbao Place mall to be at stabilized occupancy. I counted three vacancies and a good number of shoppers. This time I dined at a Japanese restaurant, noticing that their lobster dinner was priced at 2500 yuan (about $350).

The famed Wangfujing pedestrian mall, a few blocks west, was at full occupancy, as was the APM mall. This location seems to be at the epicenter of Beijing wealth. The only thing I can witness in several visits to Beijing is its continuing prosperity.

So I was wrong about this one in 2011.

Mainland China Property REITs to Multiply

Boundary between Hong Kong, on left, and Shenzhen, China, on right, photographed from Ramada Hotel
 

I’ve just returned from a recent trip to China, where financial deregulation continues onward. The week I arrived, the Chinese government approved a figurative “Through Train” that links the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. And the first two days saw a massive transfer of capital from Hong Kong to Shanghai, with little capital flowing in the reverse direction. Part of the reason is because Mainland China is still perceived as the place where the growth opportunities are, and the Chinese Yuan currency has steadily appreciated relative to the Hong Kong Dollar, which is statutorily fixed to the U.S. dollar. The continuing trade imbalance between China and the U.S. continues to propel the Chinese Yuan slowly higher relative to the Dollar.

In this continuing Chinese financial deregulation, international real estate investors should take note of the proposal to organize mainland Chinese properties into REITs to be traded starting next year on the Shanghai exchange, with assets of these REITs estimated to top $6 trillion by 2020. This is an effort to support “the ailing Chinese property industry”. The Chinese government is also admitting a slowing of the economy as they announce reductions in taxes in order to stimulate business.

But if what ails the Chinese property industry is overbuilding, attracting more investors does not solve the fundamental problems of the industry, which is in need of more tenants, not more investors. More investors just pushes asset prices upward without improving net operating income, thus driving yields down, such as in Shanghai, where current yields were once over 7% but are now less than 5%.

Such compression of yields gives the appearance of improving real estate markets even when fundamentals are not keeping pace. For instance, I blogged last year about a portfolio of southern California industrial and retail properties I monitored over 11 years and found an average decline of 17% in net operating income but and average value appreciation of 28% in the same time period.

It remains to be seen how today’s investors will react to the new possibilities of investing in Chinese REITs. Such REITs often offer the prospects of instant dividends by the use of earn-out arrangements funded in IPOs, which serve as a return of capital rather than as a return on capital. Perennial China Retail Trust is an example, initially stumbling badly in the Shenyang market before finishing more successful projects in Chengdu and Foshan. Initial investors who bought at the 70-cent IPO price saw the stock price plummet to 40 cents before recovering to today’s 54 cents per share. Those buyers at 40 cents, including some insiders, still received dividends from the earn-outs funded in the IPO and profited enormously with the earn-out dividends and partial recovery in the stock price. Buyers will need to scrutinize prospectuses for actual net operating income sufficient to fund the advertised dividends.

Meanwhile, a recent Cushman & Wakefield report shed light on where Mainland real estate capital is headed -- out of the country, to "mature markets", with the U.S. being the favorite destination and United Kingdom in second place, and Hong Kong and Singapore as the preferred destinations for real estate investments in Asia.

HUA ZHU HOTELS GROUP AND CHINA’S MIDSCALE HOTEL MARKET

Beijing's Wangfujing Night Market, a popular tourist spot.  One of the closest stalls in the photo sells barbecued scorpions.

In traveling throughout China, I have been constantly surprised to find most hotels to be independently owned and managed and unaffiliated with known franchises. The higher end hotels (such as Peninsula, Swissotel, Raffles, Hyatt) are an exception, as they are particularly suited to serving Western travelers, but at this stage in China’s march towards prosperity, with its burgeoning middle class, the time seems ripe for major hotel companies to consolidate the remainder of the Chinese lodging industry, just as was done during the 1960s and 1970s in American history, when hotel names such as Hilton and Holiday Inn became commonplace.

China has now reached a threshold in which leisure travel is taking off, presenting opportunities for mid-priced and economy hotel chains to gain market share. Meanwhile, the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has spent the last year cracking down on wasteful spending by government workers, such as stays at 5-star hotels, and local governments have enacted similar restrictions, so far as to cause 56 5-star hotels to request that they be re-labeled as 4-star hotels. This should redirect much government and business travel into midscale hotels.

Entrepreneurial forces have already been put to work to consolidate the midscale hotel market, as several Chinese companies have been building midscale hotel chains (in the 2 to 4 star range), achieving economies of scale, brand awareness and customer loyalty. These hotel chains are relatively new; none existed as a franchise before year 2003. The creation of a strong hotel brand adds great value to each such branded hotel because of central reservation systems and guest loyalty rewards programs (although the Internet has slightly eroded this value).

The most noticeable Chinese franchises are 7 Days Inns, a limited service chain similar to Super 8 (which is also common in China), Jinjiang Inns, a state-owned hotel company that covers the higher end of “midscale”, and Hua Zhu Hotels Group, an assemblage of several different brands such as Starway, Hi Inn and Hanting.

Hanting Beijing Wangfujing Hotel, with nightly rates starting at $46

Hua Zhu has particularly attracted attention recently because of its very rapid growth, surpassing Jinjiang Inns before 2010 to become China’s largest hotel chain. Hua Zhu Hotels Group had its IPO on NASDAQ in 2010 (as China Lodging Group) and has expanded its reach from 413 hotels at the time of its IPO to 1425 hotels today, with 152,879 rooms in all. China Lodging Group stock (symbol HTHT) opened on NASDAQ in 2010 at $13.50 per share and is now trading at $26.60 per share. There have been two days this month in which HTHT was listed on Yahoo Finance’s top 5 stocks “gaining on unusual volume”.

Hua Zhu Hotels Group has existed since 2005, and its revenues expanded 60-fold in 6 years, as follows:

Year Revenues (RMB) Earnings (RMB)           # of hotels
2006 54,031,000
2007 235,306.000        -111,623,000
2008 764,249,000        -136,162,000                 167
2009 1,260,191,000        42,545,000                 236
2010 1,738,493,000      215,751,000                 438
2011 2,249,597,000      114,832,000                 639
2012 3,224,527,000      174,887,000               1035
2013* 4,153,000,000*    221,000,000 **           1425
*projected
**first 3 quarters

As of the 3rd quarter of 2013, average daily occupancy was 94%, average daily rate was 186 RMB ($30.74) and REVPAR (revenue per available room) was 175 RMB ($28.93). While these numbers are lower than those of 2010, Hua Zhu explains it is because they are shifting towards lower-tier cities in their expansion. Meanwhile, their frequent guest program is reported to have more than 13 million members, constituting 80% of room nights sold.

Because the Hua Zhu brand is now so well established, Hua Zhu can now move from a business model in which most of their hotels were once leased and operated to a business model emphasizing managing and franchising, enabling Hua Zhu to expand its reach with much less capital and operations risk, much like the other most successful hotel franchises. 60% of their hotels are now managed and franchised vs. owned as leasehold.

The recent dip in share price to $26.60 would indicate a price/earnings ratio of 28 for the trailing 12 months, but the first two quarters reported minimal earnings (mainly due to depreciation expense) despite strongly positive cash flows from operations, whereas the last two quarters had respective earnings of 39 cents per share and 50 cents per share, suggesting a much lower PE ratio based on forward earnings. The recent dip in price seems to be caused by a general overreaction to the most recently reported  dip in PMI (from 50.5 to 49.6) in China.  Even the Chinese internet stocks such as QIHU (down 10% after the report) and YY (down 7.4%) are behaving in similar fashion despite being unrelated to the manufacturing sector.

Disclosure: I own this stock.

Shanghai's Xujiahui District and Starway Xujiahui Royal Garden Hotel, with rack rates starting at $76

Chinese Housing Bubble

The chart below may explain the reason for seemingly contradictory reports of housing shortages vs. reports of ghost cities of empty new apartments in China. The chart, published on www.newgeography.com , shows a long-term misallocation of capital towards construction of luxury apartments, whereas affordable housing is in short supply.



In my previous post two years ago on the Beijing housing shortage, http://www.internationalappraiser.com/search?q=beijing+housing , I had spoken to a recent college graduate who described how 6 to 8 recent graduates would have to share one apartment because of the lack of affordability, yet there also media reports, including Leslie Stahl’s 60 Minutes visit to China and interview of Wang Shi, China’s biggest real estate developer, indicating thousands of empty condos in places such as Zhengzhou, Urdos and Tianjin. One memorable irony of this 60 Minutes episode was the sight of poor villagers in Zhengzhou salvaging bricks from the rubble of their modest homes, razed to build new condo towers, while empty condo towers loomed in the background. It was explained that these villagers couldn’t possibly afford the newly built high-rise residences.

In the U.S.A., the sight of so many empty condo towers was the precursor to the bankruptcy of such lenders as IndyMac Bank, whereas it is surprising to learn that in China, these empty towers are actually sold out to small investors. Middle class Chinese investors have very few investment options:

1. Put the money in the bank and earn a very low interest rate.
2. Invest in Chinese stocks traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, in companies that Chinese investors consider to be dodgy and dishonest. (They are restricted from investing in Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong exchange, which are more trusted because they have to meet higher financial and reporting standards.)
3. Invest in real estate, which has always gone up in value in their lifetime.

This has led to massive investment in residential real estate, and the Chinese government has already taken steps to curb speculative demand for housing with restrictions on loan-to-value ratios for investor-owned housing and the number of units that can be owned.

Nevertheless, when so much money is sitting in empty homes with no renters, the fundamental economic law of supply and demand ultimately forces home prices lower.
Future investors will be dissuaded from investing in these homes with no prospect of income, and sales prices will decrease as a result. This is an inexorable economic law, much as the physical law of gravity, which no society can escape.

The potential result is that millions of middle class Chinese families will lose much of their wealth in an inescapable housing crash, similar to events that have already transpired in places such as the U.S., Spain and Ireland.

Appraisals for Chinese divorce in California

    Beijing night market, September 2011

This blog has attracted inquiries from two separate California divorce attorneys who share a similar problem – what happens when Chinese couples divorce in the state of California and the marital assets must be divided 50-50, but those marital assets include residences in the People’s Republic of China?

 They need residential appraisal reports, but the reports must be in the English language and be literate enough to be submitted to a court of law.  Finding an English-literate Chinese residential appraiser is easier said than done, but to be fair, the Chinese have done a much better job learning English than Americans have done in learning Chinese. 

 When I have searched the directories of international appraisal organizations, I find the Chinese members to be sophisticated commercial real estate appraisers who appraise corporate assets, but who does one turn to for a simple condo apartment appraisal?

 China Daily News has reported that there are about 550 appraisal companies in China, but finding one is a challenge in itself.  The most recent request I received was for the valuation of 4 apartments, three in Beijing’s ChaoYang District, in central Beijing, and one in the ShanDong province halfway between Beijing and Shanghai. 

 I contacted several Beijing appraisers listed in the Appraisal Institute directory but got only one response – with a price quote of 30,000 Chinese Yuan, or about $4750, which shattered my “everything is cheaper in Chinatown” way of thinking. The sample appraisal reports from the firm also showed how appraisal jargon can get lost in translation. For instance, what we call “comparables” were instead labeled as “contemporaries”.

While pondering this issue, I was contacted by my friend Ian Ng, the chief appraiser for the Hong Kong appraisal firm of Ascent Partners, who is about to embark on a U.S. business development tour.  I have collaborated with them before on corporate asset valuations and already knew of their ability to write lucid English-language appraisal reports, and he told me that they had the ability to handle such an assignment at a fairer price. 

The divorce attorney was pleased, but he also explained that the inherently emotional nature of divorce often leads to frequent starts and stops. In the mean time, I am willing to hear from any other Beijing or Shanghai residential appraisers.

And for Chinese husbands, treat your wives well.  Remember -- they get half.

Shenyang and PCRT update

As reported in the April 25th edition of Retail Traffic, “Shenyang, China was the most active market for new development [in the world] in 2011 with 10.76 million sq. ft. [1 million square meters] of new retail space completed.” CBRE ranked Shenyang as second in the world in retail construction last year, with 2.18 million more square meters under construction in 18 separate projects.

Shenyang is a city of 5.7 million residents and ranks as the 11th most populous “urban area” in China (“urban area” being the term most analogous to the western concept of “city”.)

What this means is that Shenyang has increased retail space at a more rapid pace than most other large Chinese cities, which are themselves no slackers in building malls. Yet GDP per capita (the predominantly used statistic since household incomes are not measured) is less than half that of Shanghai. I have not heard the story yet on why Shenyang should have significantly higher hopes than other Chinese cities.

I have visited and focused previously on Shenyang because of it contains the only operating assets in the portfolio of Perennial China Retail Trust. Shenyang seems particularly at risk of retail overdevelopment, particularly the Dadong district containing the Shenyang Longemont Asia Pacific City development. The 2011 Market Study suggested a quadrupling of shopping center space in this area. Moreover, PCRT is designed to enrich its sponsors regardless of the success of its properties (such as compensation based on valuations performed according to blatantly unrealistic "extraordinary assumptions" dictated to the valuers), and the normal feasibility study process was thus compromised. 

The PCRT share price began sinking in February, possibly as a result of unfavorable news of a 39% decline in occupancy at the Red Star Macalline Mall as of December 11 (which had opened at 91.8% occupancy but was down to 56% as of December). The report to shareholders acknowledges that Chinese government initiatives to cool down the housing market have had an adverse impact on the sale of home furnishings, thereby hurting the tenants of Red Star Macalline Mall. PCRT has reported that they have relocated remaining tenants into one half of the mall, while the other half of the mall will be re-tenanted with conventional retail tenants, thus competing with their own Longemont Mall next door.

One surprising claim, though, was that the slow leasing performance of the Longemont Mall was due to a 3-month delay in the opening of the mall until October due to fire department regulations. My visit occurred in September and was instigated by the news that the mall had opened on July 1st. Furthermore, DBS (one of the IPO underwriters) published a favorable report on PCRT on November 14, 2011, with the title "Perennial China Retail Trust - Execution on Track", also informing the readers that the mall had opened in July. They set a 12-month price target of 83 cents. I noticed that their cameras carefully avoided photographing any vacant space, though.

It should be understood that the property inspectors and independent valuers are the paid advocates of PCRT management, hence explaining the wildly optimistic price targets and valuations.

Last week, the share price popped from 49.5 cents to 52 cents on news of Kuok Khoon Hong, the founder of Wilmar, a palm oil company, raising his stake in PCRT to 16.9%, seen as a vote of confidence. The purchase was at a price of only 44.6 cents per share, though, by a purchasing consortium 49.5% owned by Wilmar and 20% owned by CEO Pua Seck Guan. There is no buy that happens without a sell, however, and it should very concerning that the seller was Shanghai Summit, the local development partner in the Shenyang PCRT properties, effectively reducing their ownership stake from 14.9% to 0. When the developer in charge of the project bails out like this, shouldn't investors be concerned, particularly at a price of 44.6 cents per share? When the co-owner with the most local knowledge bails out, that is never a good sign.

PCRT is currently at 52.5 cents per share, creating a 17.7% two-week gain for buyers Kuok and CEO Pua Seck Guan.

Meanwhile, the latest "independent valuation" valuation still valued the entire PCRT portfolio as of the end of 2011 as completed and leased to 95% occupancy. I don't know why such fiction is permitted in Singapore, but if such a valuation report had been published in the USA, this would invite a class action lawsuit from disgruntled investors.

Disclosures: None. I have no short or long position in this stock and have no plans to initiate such a position.

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Shanghai's Lujiazui financial district and "Skyscraper Index Theory"

From left to right: Shanghai World Financial Center, Jin Mao Tower, and the intended 2073-foot Shanghai Tower under construction

The last three years has inspired debate about whether China is going through a real estate bubble. Prior to my first visit, I had read beforehand of 64 million vacant Chinese apartments and 50% office vacancy rates in Beijing and Shanghai. When I arrived in China, I did not see this, except for some vacant luxury retail malls in second-tier locations. Perhaps some of these vacancy estimates were inaccurate or even hyped to make China look foolish. Claims of 64 million vacant apartments seemed preposterous when urban Chinese people told me they couldn’t find an affordable one, but to bubble theorists I have found the following chart from Wendell Cox of NewGeography.com. (My undergraduate degree was in Geography.) If there is a surplus, it is in the construction of luxury housing, which has been built more rapidly than affordable housing.

In the most recent Jones Lang LaSalle global office space count, the picture became clearer about all that formerly vacant office space in Beijing and Shanghai – it has been leased. By JLL's measures, Shanghai and Beijing ranked first and third respectively in the global absorption of office space during 2011.

Focus on Shanghai

I recently visited the two tallest skyscrapers in Shanghai, side by side, the World Financial Center and the Jin Mao Tower, both exceeding 1300 feet in height. Both have Hyatt Hotels atop office towers each with over 75 floors of office space. The building directories both indicate almost no vacant floors.

Despite such apparent success, there has been a recent re-introduction of a “skyscraper index” theory that portends a coming recession that naturally occurs after a flurry of new “world’s tallest buildings”, a theory that has been recently re-introduced by Barclays Capital’s equity research team in Hong Kong. This theory is not meant to imply causation, but instead reasons that having so many “world’s tallest buildings” built at once is but one symptom of a significant misallocation of capital that creates asset bubbles and resultant crashes. The recently published Barclays paper points out that of the world’s skyscrapers under construction, 53% are situated in China, which will be expanding its stock of skyscrapers by 87% by year 2017.

The crane-dominated Lujiazui skyline. The trapezoidal hole at the top of the Shanghai World Financial Center is designed to reduce building sway from high winds at this 1600-foot altitude. The hole was originally designed as a circle by the Japanese developers, which was perceived unfavorably by older Chinese generations as symbolic of the "Rising Sun" emblem on the Japanese flag -- an offensive reminder of the Japanese occupation during the last century.

Origins of the "skyscraper index theory"

The “skyscraper index” theory appears to date back to a 1999 paper by Andrew Lawrence, research director for Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, perhaps in response to the southeast Asian financial meltdown concurrent with the opening of the world’s new tallest buildings of the time – the Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur. The southeast Asian region was collapsing in debt much like the current Eurozone crisis.

Some empirical evidence consistent with the skyscraper index theory

Since the beginning of the 20th Century, there seem to be some interesting correlations.

The famous Panic of 1907 coincided with the construction of two new world’s tallest buildings in New York. The 612-foot Singer Building was completed in 1908 while the old Metropolitan Life Tower (not the one blocking Park Avenue) was completed in 1909 at a height of 700 feet. The one year Panic of 1907 led to an approximate 30% decline in business activity and the severe monetary contraction was the impetus for the creation of the Federal Reserve System.

The 791-foot Woolworth Building in New York was completed in 1913 during the two-year recession of 1913-1914 which saw an estimated 26% decline in business activity as well as a decline in personal incomes. The Woolworth Building was just one of many New York skyscrapers completed at that time.

It was not until 17 years later that three new world’s tallest buildings were completed in rapid succession – the 928-foot Bank of Manhattan Trust Building (40 Wall Street) in 1930, followed by the 1050-foot Chrysler Building later that year, followed by the 1250-foot Empire State Building completed in 1931, all while the nation was sinking into the Great Depression.

It was not until more than 40 years later that the records were shattered by the 1368-foot World Trade Center in New York, opening in 1973, and then the 1450-foot Sears Tower in Chicago, which opened in 1974 amidst the worst U.S. recession since the Great Depression. Interestingly enough, you will find no offices built between the years of 1974 and 1980 in almost any American CBD.

The world height record was not exceeded until 1998, with the opening of the 1483-foot Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur at a time when southeast Asia was in financial crisis.

One interesting exception to the skyscraper index theory is the opening of the 1671-foot Taipei 101 building in 2003. Economic disaster did not strike.

Last of all, there is the 2717-foot Burj Khalifa that opened in Dubai in 2010 at a time when Dubai was about to default on its sovereign debt and was rescued at the last moment by its UAE neighbors. Perhaps this is the most obvious example of misallocation of capital as this building still stands largely vacant.

What are the implications for Shanghai?

In 2007, the Shanghai World Financial Center was completed at a height of 1614 feet, exceeding the 1381-foot Jin Mao Tower next to it. More auspicious, however, is the adjacent construction of the Shanghai Tower, which will top out at 2073 feet, making it the world’s second tallest building.

It is interesting to observe that the adjacent Shanghai World Financial Center and Jin Mao towers are both fully occupied. Bubble naysayers can easily say, “Look. All that space got built and leased.” The Shanghai Tower could be a game-changer, though, according to the “skyscraper index” theory, as the bubble just got larger.

Thanks to reader Ms. Ng in Chicago for pointing out that the pavement near these skyscrapers, which were built on landfill, is actually buckling. This appears to be some ugly concrete patchwork.

Not to be outdone by Shanghai, the Greenland Financial Center under construction in the Chinese city of Wuhan is considering a redesign that will have it top out at 2087 feet. When towers are built to assuage civic egos or developer’s egos rather than meet financial measures, watch out – a bubble is in the making.





My own “L.A. freeway model” of real estate bubbles

Those of us who have had to commute to distant jobs in southern California spend a lot of time in freeway traffic and often find patterns to get to our destinations quicker. Here is one pattern I learned early on:

When traffic is moving smoothly on eight-lane freeways, one can drive fastest in the “fast lane”, the lane farthest left in societies where traffic moves on the right side of the road. However, when the volume of traffic reaches a certain saturation point, the fast lane is beset with the most sudden decelerations, causing cars behind to hit their brakes even harder, and the fast lane suddenly becomes the slowest lane. It is during these types of traffic conditions that I make the quickest progress by driving in the far right lane where traffic is entering or exiting.

Liken a fast-moving freeway lane to a fast-moving economy, and the point I make is this: the fastest growing economies experience the hardest landings, or “the most sudden decelerations”. I have witnessed it many times before – Texas in the 1980s, southern California in the early 1990s, and recent examples in Las Vegas, Phoenix and Florida. That is why I say, “Watch out, Shanghai.”

For other information or views on an impending Chinese real estate crash, check out www.Chinesecrash.com.

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“RED STAR MACALLINE MALLS” in China

Red Star Macalline Mall on Shanghai's northwest side, from which I took the featured interior photos

In recent posts concerning Perennial China Retail Trust, I have referred to this unique retail mall type, a mall that specializes exclusively in furniture and home furnishings to retail end-users in an attractive, upscale setting. This mall type benefits from the virtues of agglomeration similar to the success of “auto malls” in the U.S. The object is to attract the consumer wishing to make a one-stop shopping trip in furnishing a new home.

 

This is a property type not commonly available to retail consumers in the U.S. The closest aesthetic equivalent I can think of is Chicago’s Merchandise Mart, which serves as a wholesale showroom mall restricted to buyers from major retailers. What Red Star Macalline does is eliminate the middleman.

Red Star Macalline began as a furniture manufacturer and morphed into an innovator in the sales of home furnishings and design services within a retail mall concept, switching from being a tenant to being a landlord. Founded in the 1980s, Red Star Macalline opened its first malls in 1991 in and sales took off, crowding out the furniture retailing efforts of western furniture vendors not sufficiently attuned to the furniture shopping habits of Chinese consumers. At last count, there are now 100 Red Star Macalline Malls in China.

At a Red Star Macalline Mall, home furnishings shoppers can haggle with individual merchants and also arrange turn-key design services. This is a consumer behavior that Home Depot and La Maison were not sufficiently accustomed to, having had to close many stores in China, but Ikea keeps persevering, even building its own store adjacent to the Pudong Red Star Macalline mall, easily seen during the taxi ride into Shanghai from the airport.

Mona Lisa bedroom set. "Faux Baroque" is said to be the preferred interior decor for China's nouveau riche.

Still, such a duplicative and complementary unit mix is somewhat risky at a time when the Chinese government has been putting the brakes on home lending. Less homes sold means less furnishings sold, and the recent shareholders’ report from PCRT confirms that Shenyang Longemont Red Star Macalline Mall has had its occupancy slip from 92% to 56% for that very stated reason. Existing tenants will be consolidated in one part of the mall while a broader array of tenants will be solicited for the remainder of the mall in Shenyang.

While the Chinese government does not publish data on household incomes, the closest figure it uses to compare city wealth is GDP per capita. Shanghai leads the mainland (excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Mongolia) with $20,000 annual GDP per capita, while Shenyang has less than half, last reported as $9244 per capita.

Sofa alone is priced at over 16,000 RMB ($2500 USD)

The recent slowdown in U.S. housing had severe consequences for the home furnishings industry, with the bankruptcy of such major furniture brands as Levitz and Wickes. While the housing sales slowdown in China is government policy-induced rather than credit-induced, there may be the hope of a quicker turnaround in furniture sales if the government policy is reversed (loosening restrictions on financing and homebuying by investors and “migrants”). In the mean time, China Central Television reported that sales at some home furnishing malls in Beijing decreased by more than 30 percent year-on-year in early 2012. Some small companies were forced out of business.

Side note on the just-published PCRT shareholders’ report for the upcoming meeting

PCRT has been slightly more forthright recently in reporting “independent valuation” results, mentioning this time (in footnotes) that the CBRE valuation is actually based on the assumption that all properties are completed and fully leased. CBRE has even raised its valuation this time. But with Shenyang Red Star’s occupancy slipping so badly, what purpose does such a hypothetical valuation serve other than to mislead shareholders? Would Warren Buffett report to shareholders in such a manner? What is the main purpose of an “independent valuation” other than to be independent and uninfluenced by the very managers whose compensation will be determined by the valuation itself, as disclosed in the IPO?

More on Shanghai soon

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The Reasons Behind the Overbuilding of Luxury Retail Malls in China

Some readers may have mistakenly ascribed a political agenda to my postings about Chinese real estate. My views on commercial real estate are nonpartisan and non-ideological.

To those who think that I have been poking fun at “The Communists” or the Chinese government, I point out that the fiascos I've reported have been capitalistic decisions of private owners and investors which happen to have occurred on Chinese soil. (Only one, New South China Mall, had some government involvement, as it was financed by the Agricultural Bank of China, which was State-owned at the time of funding nine years ago.)

I even disagree with the notion that the People’s Republic of China is a communist society. During my trips to the PRC I’ve met many Chinese people, none who have ever expressed the sentiment that he or she wanted to create a classless, utopian society that benefited “The People” rather than themselves. Most just tell me “I want to be rich”. If I ask for an opinion of Chairman Mao, I generally get a strange look which implicitly asks “What century are you living in?”

As part of enforced “general education” requirements as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, I was required to read The Communist Manifesto and The Russian Revolution (strictly in the context of critical inquiry), and neither Karl Marx nor Lenin ever stated that “The People shall have an Omega watch store every four blocks.” or "From each, according to his abilities; to each, a Gucci handbag." Overbuilding is not a Marxist concept, but Marx did explain in Das Kapital that overproduction is part of the natural outcome of a capitalistic society.

Karl Marx has probably caused more human suffering than any other philosopher who ever lived, but his criticism of capitalism was often insightful. He explained that technological advances increase labor productivity, which increases material wealth in the ruling classes while diminishing wages of workers, creating “poverty in the midst of plenty” manifested by overproduction and underconsumption. That may just be what is ailing China at the moment, as Chinese consumer spending as a proportion of GDP has been declining for the last half century in China.

Article in October issue of Shopping Centers Today

Next month’s issue of Shopping Centers Today (the house publication of the International Council of Shopping Centers) quotes me among other analysts in an article entitled “Many shiny new malls in Asia are devoid of tenants and shoppers”. Curt Hazlett reports many new but empty luxury malls in both China and India. There are various reasons cited, chiefly lack of experience and market analysis by the actual developers, who are private entrepreneurs.

This misallocation of resources is now being discouraged by the Chinese government. Recently, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission has been trying to proactively engineer a soft landing to a real estate bubble through stricter bank regulations. Reckless Chinese developers now find themselves unable to get Chinese bank loans for ill-conceived projects. The People’s Bank of China reports, for instance, that new lending to property developers declined to 42 billion yuan ($6.56 billion USD) in the second quarter of 2011, down 75% from 168 billion yuan in the first quarter. I have also seen similar policies put in place by the elected governments of Singapore and Hong Kong.

Real estate developers the world over are like heroin addicts, constantly seeking financing, and Chinese developers are no exception. If you give enough money to a developer, he will develop, because that is his raison d’etre. Chinese developers have found two alternate sources of funding after the shutting off of the Chinese banking spigot: private trust companies within China, which funnel investments from wealthy individuals and companies, and REITs created on foreign stock exchanges. The Chinese government is now cracking down on trust company lending, too.

So what is currently causing the continued overbuilding of luxury malls in China? In short, it is foreign investment. The “Chinese economic miracle” has been oversold to naïve foreign investors by self-serving capitalists. If the focus is on wealthy Chinese, most of their shopping is done outside the country, particularly in Hong Kong, in order to escape the VAT, the customs duty tax and the consumption tax, together adding up to as high as 60% on imported goods. That is why all the Hong Kong malls are full.

This last year has shown that it is easier to finance grandiose Chinese commercial real estate development schemes with equity offerings on foreign exchanges than with Chinese lenders. These equity investors (shareholders) have often been suckered because the "Chinese economic miracle" story has been so compelling and the IPO sponsors have been less than forthright. The logic that Chinese GDP growth is causing equivalent growth in consumer demand is contradicted by actual statistics: Per ISI Emerging Markets Inc., who maintains the CEIC China Premium Database, Chinese consumer spending as a proportion of GDP has now hit an all-time low of 34% and predicted to decline for two more years after being about 45% one decade ago and about 50% two decades ago, not quite the "consumption revolution" crowed about on empty New South China Mall's web site.

Walking through empty retail malls in Dongguan, Beijing and Shenyang, I was struck by the high prices on the merchandise offered. The median household income for Class-1 and Class-2 cities is estimated to be about $5700 per year, about 12% of the U.S. median, which is not conducive to a Gucci lifestyle. (The Chinese national average is about $3300 per year.) Wealthy Chinese, however, have the ability to travel and shop outside the country, where they find lower prices on luxury items, whether in Hong Kong, Singapore, Beverly Hills, or Vancouver. (Hong Kong attracts many Chinese shoppers due to the lack of a sales or value-added tax.) That narrows down the universe who have the resources and desire to buy their luxury goods domestically.

Recruiting foreign investors

Foreign investors may have misconceptions about Chinese shoppers based on the Chinese shoppers who travel to their own countries. These shoppers represent the affluent class of China, which is small in proportion to the total population. Mall investment sponsors have been capitalizing on this misconception.

Foreign investors are easier to take advantage of than Chinese investors due to their lack of legal recourse when they are cheated. Law enforcement can be heavy-handed within China. For instance, while I was staying in Shenzhen, the former mayor had just been convicted of corruption and sentenced to death. Executives of a company committing fraud on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges are subject to severe criminal penalties, particularly if they cheat the government. Not so if the company is listed on a foreign exchange, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, New York or Toronto.

From GAAP to CRAAP

Just as U.S. securities laws are not extra-territorial, neither are Chinese securities laws. China does not have GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), so the rules governing accounting are different; Chinese accounting policy has been nicknamed CRAAP (Chinese Regularly Accepted Accounting Policy) by hedge fund manager Jim Chanos.

The Chinese economic miracle has been a 30-year growth trajectory that has averaged annual GDP growth of 10% per year (according to the government) and created 115 billionaires as of the last Forbes count. Just remember, though, that the building of empty malls and office buildings is part of that GDP growth.

Chinese consumer spending has failed to keep pace, too, as Chinese household income, is less than 10% of U.S. household income. This is what Marx predicted would happen to capitalist societies, that workers would end up being financially unable to buy the very products they were producing. The empty luxury malls are evidence of that.

The Beijing Gateway Plaza fraud controversy

Almost any real estate valuation report in the world has the same “limiting condition” buried within the report which reads more or less as follows:

“We have relied to a very considerable extent on the information provided by the owners and have accepted their representations of tenancy, occupancy, financial performance, site area and floor area, which we assume to be true and accurate. We take no responsibility for inaccurate client-supplied data and subsequent conclusions related to such data.”

What if the property owner lied, though? Then, the accuracy of the valuation is compromised. This is a problem the world over, particularly when the property owner is the one who hired the valuer.

This week’s lawsuit by Tin Lik, a Hong Kong developer, against the trustees of the RREEF China Commercial Trust is an interesting example of the consequences of misrepresentations. This lawsuit came immediately after the June 30th judgment against Tin Lik in the case of HSBC Institutional Trust Services v. Tin Lik, decided by The High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

HSBC Institutional Trust Services was the trustee of the RREEF China Commercial Trust, a Hong Kong REIT having the Beijing Gateway Plaza office complex as its sole asset. On June 4th, 2007 the Trust bought Gateway Plaza from Tin Lik based on Tin Lik’s representations of rental income, representations which were discovered to be false by the newly appointed REIT manager, RREEF China REIT Management Limited, who then calculated the financial value of the discrepancies to be HK$278,526,708. These discrepancies and the estimation of financial loss were later reviewed and confirmed by an independent subcommittee which included an un-named international accounting firm.

On September 7, 2007, Tin Lik agreed to pay the full sum of HK$278,526,708 and promised to make further payments if that sum was later found to be insufficient. Such an action is tantamount to a guilty plea.

A new valuation of the property was done on September 30, 2007, establishing a value of HK$3,699,000,000. After taking into consideration the HK$278 million already paid by Tin Lik, the Net Asset Value attributable to all the unit holders was still HK$69,663,000 lower than if the rents had never been misrepresented.

The Sale and Purchase Agreement by which the Trust acquired Beijing Gateway from Tin Lik established monetary “set-offs” for other discrepancies as well, such as breach of warranties. Tin Lik had warranted certain equipment such as lifts (elevators) and HVAC as being in good repair and reasonable working order, having been regularly and properly maintained and not dangerous or obsolete, but some of the equipment had to be repaired or replaced.

There was also a guarantee of billboard rental income of RMB35 million for the first year, 38 million for the second year, and 40 million for the third year, but the tenant defaulted.

Based on the breach of warranties, the REIT manager calculated further “set-offs” due from Tin Lik as being:

HK $216,890,160 in 2007
HK $ 35,270,591 in 2008
HK $ 11,533,376 in 2009 and
HK $ 12,902,544 in 2010, which adds up to HK$276,596,671 additionally due to the Trust from Tin Lik.

Tin Lik disputed the set-offs and on May 20, 2010, sent a letter demanding repayment of the HK$287,497,000 he paid on September 7, 2007 to settle discrepancies related to rental income. Unfortunately, the property was sold to Mapletree India China Fund on February 3, 2010, and after the sale, a Special Resolution of the unitholders was passed on March 31, 2010 to terminate the Trust and delist it from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

Tin Lik is now contending that he was coerced into admitting fraud and making the HK$287,497,000 payment to the Trustees in his new lawsuit, which seeks to recover that payment.

Related articles

• Mapletree Said to Prepare $1.2 Billion IPO of Property Assets

"Independent Valuation" Problems in Chinese Equity Offerings

One notable scandal this last month was the public accusation that Sino-Forest, a Chinese forestry resources company traded on the Toronto Exchange (TRE.TO), is no more than a Ponzi scheme. The accusation was made by Hong Kong equity research firm Muddy Waters, LLC, in a 40-page research report reminiscent of Harry Markopolos’s expose of the Madoff Ponzi scheme.

I will not comment on the merits of the accusation other than to say that there is enough fraud coming out of China that I don’t see a reason for an analyst to make up false stories. On U.S. exchanges alone, eleven Chinese companies have had their securities registrations revoked by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and 24 more have been forced to address accounting irregularities or auditor resignations, and of the 19 most recent filings of class action securities lawsuits in the U.S., at least 5 have been against Chinese companies. The simple observation that Sino-Forest has produced no free cash flow or dividends in 16 years in spite of escalating revenues is cause for suspicion. John Paulson dumped his shares right away after the MW report.

Some of you may wonder about the CFE initials in my by-line. They stand for "Certified Fraud Examiner", a credential awarded by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. One thing we were taught in our educational program is that fraud is a crime of opportunity. It will move to areas where the controls are weakest, opacity is greatest, and greed and a miraculous story get in the way of due diligence and reason. This makes China an ideal place to commit fraud, just as Florida and Las Vegas were 5 years ago.

Foreign investors are wowed by China's reported 10% annual GDP growth rate and accept Chinese financial reporting with the assumption that auditors and valuers know everything going on within a Chinese company. Many Chinese companies create a labyrinth of offshore entities in the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands to hide transactions or owners from view. Sino-Forest and Hui Xian have both done that.

As for Sino-Forest, Muddy Waters specifically addressed the reliability of the "independent valuation" report, as follows:

"TRE provides fraudulent data to Poyry, which
produces reports that do nothing to ensure that TRE is
legitimate."

and

"TRE became more sophisticated – engaging Jakko Poyry to write valuation reports, all the while giving Poyry manipulated data and restricting its scope of work. Thus more and more investors are drawn into TRE’s fraud every year as it falsifies timber investments and manipulates Poyry further."

One common theme of the Muddy Waters analysis and my own blogs about Perennial China Retail Trust and Hui Xian REIT is the use and abuse of so-called “independent valuation reports” from respected firms with valuers possessing respected credentials. In each case, the sponsors that hired the valuers restricted the scope of work or imposed assignment conditions which impaired the reliability of the reports. Each example is explained as follows:

Independent valuation of Sino-Forest (TRE.TO)

As Muddy Waters describes, the independent valuation firm Jaakko Poyry couched its valuation opinion with multiple disclaimers such as follows:

• “Poyry has not viewed any of the contracts relating to forest land-use rights, cutting rights, or forest asset purchases.”

• “It is important to understand that this is not a confirmation of forest ownership, but rather a verification of the mapped and recorded areas of stocker forest.”

These types of disclaimers naturally arouse suspicion, as in Shakespeare’s famous phrase, “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” Why would the valuer feel the need to make such statements unless he knew something was wrong?


Independent valuation of Perennial China Retail Trust (N9LU.SI)

Here’s a situation in which the annual base fee to the Sponsor is established by independent valuation, but the “independent valuer” was asked to assume that all five properties had been acquired and developed and leased to full occupancy, when only one of five properties had been built and two only existed as purchase options. The inflated appraised value of about $1.1 billion SGD is 54% above market capitalization at the close of markets on July 4th. The $1.1 billion SGD appraised value translates to an annual base fee of $3,850,000.

The valuation firm also performed limited due diligence, as they explained as follows in the valuation report that was included in the IPO prospectus:

“Whilst CB Richard Ellis has endeavoured to assure the accuracy of the factual information, it has not independently verified all information provided by the Trustee-Manager (primarily copies of leases and financial information with respect to the Properties as well as reports by independent consultants engaged by the Trustee-Manager).

CB Richard Ellis has relied upon property data supplied by the Trustee-Manager which we assume to be true and accurate. CB Richard Ellis takes no responsibility for inaccurate client supplied data and subsequent conclusions related to such data.

This confidential document is for the sole use of persons directly provided with it by CB Richard Ellis (Pte) Ltd. Use by, or reliance upon this document by anyone other than Perennial China Retail Trust Management Pte. Ltd. (as Trustee-Manager of Perennial China Retail Trust) is not authorised by CB Richard Ellis and CB Richard Ellis is not liable for any loss arising from such unauthorised use or reliance. This document should not be reproduced without our prior written authority.”


Independent valuation of Beijing Oriental Plaza (Hui Xian REIT)

The owners had been receiving valuations of its only property, Beijing Oriental Plaza, from DTZ Debenham Tie Leung Limited on an annual basis. The valuation was RMB 11.2 billion at the end of 2009 and RMB 20 billion as of October 31, 2010, based on a decline in market capitalization rates and an increase in rents of 2% for offices and 6.7% for retail tenants.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of the IPO and the estimation of a “revaluation surplus” distribution to the previous owners, a different valuer was chosen – American Appraisal China Limited -- who estimated market value to be RMB31.4 billion as of January 31, 2011, just three months after the DTZ valuation of RMB 20 billion, a further increase in value of 57%. Despite this new valuation, though, the IPO sponsors priced the entire offering at between RMB 26.2 billion and 27.9 billion, 11 to 17% below appraised value. Why would the Sponsors price below appraised value unless they didn’t believe the appraised value of AAC? Why did they switch valuation firms? As of July 5th, market capitalization has dropped to RMB 23.45 billion, which is only 75% of appraised value.

More specific concerns about the valuation report are presented in my Hui Xian blog.

The appraised value of RMB 31.4 billion was used to establish a “revaluation surplus” of RMB 7.775 billion payable to the previous owners, although the market capitalization of the entire REIT was never that high, and current market capitalization suggests that no such surplus value exists. The amount of “revaluation surplus” was based on subtracting net book value of RMB 23.635 billion from the appraised value of RMB 31.41 billion, but current market capitalization of RMB 23.45 billion suggests that no revaluation surplus is warranted, and that the RMB 7.775 billion is money that has been taken from investors through a dishonest scheme.

The new valuers also performed limited due diligence, as they explained as follows:

“We have not carried out on-site measurements to verify the areas of the Property and assume the areas contained in the documents provided to us are correct. We have no reason to doubt the truth and accuracy of the information as provided to us by BOP and Commerce and Finance Law Offices on PRC law. We have also been advised by BOP that no material facts have been omitted from the information so supplied. We consider we have been provided with sufficient information to reach an informed view.”


Conclusion

Allowing IPO and subsequent offering sponsors to order “independent valuations” is a blatant conflict of interest, although this is a problem that is not unique to China. Moreover, an "independent valuation" that refuses or is not permitted to perform verification of factual information, such as ownership, financial operations, or property size, is useless and misleading to investors.

Investors should understand that valuers typically put disclaimers and limiting conditions in their valuation reports to prevent liability for passing on fraudulent data. They basically assume that everything the property owner states is true. This does nothing to ensure that valuers rely on accurate data, but deceives investors into thinking that the valuation reports are thorough and accurate.

Disclosure: I do not have any short or long positions in these stocks.

Hui Xian REIT IPO / Beijing Oriental Plaza 汇贤产业信托

My last blog about Perennial China Retail Trust presented an example of a Chinese real estate IPO designed to enrich the sponsor rather than investors. Another recent, self-serving IPO focused on Chinese real estate is Hui Xian Real Estate Investment Trust, which is focused exclusively on Bejing’s landmark Oriental Plaza. Oriental Plaza is a 787,059 square meter (8.5 million square feet) mixed-use complex in the Dongcheng district west of the Beijing CBD. Oriental Plaza is partly owned by billionaire Li Ka-Shing, Hong Kong’s wealthiest man and no. 11 on the Forbes billionaires list. His organization is known as Cheung Kong Holdings.

Much as Warren Buffett holds “sage” status in the U.S., Li Ka-Shing holds “Superman” status in Hong Kong, bringing instant credibility to his IPOs. An investor has to first ask, though, what the reason for the IPO may be. The property is already acquired and has performed very well to this date. Mr. Li is not adding to his stake in Hui Xian. If anything, he is lessening his stake, as the use of the proceeds is to reduce bank debt and intracompany indebtedness (to Hui Xian Cayman, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hui Xian Holdings, which is 33.4% owned by Cheung Kong Holdings), which not coincidentally reduces the debt levels and increases the net asset value of Cheung Kong Holdings.

Better yet, going public has also allowed the owners to be paid a "pre-listing distribution" of the "revaluation surplus" of RMB 7.3 billion (>$1 billion USD) due to the property being valued at RMB 31,410,000,000, even though the IPO priced Oriental Plaza at RMB 26.2 billion to 27.9 billion (why so low if the property is really worth 31.4 billion yuan?). Moreover, the owners hired a different valuer for the IPO valuation even though they had just had the property appraised for RMB 20 billion on October 31, 2010, an increase of RMB 8.8 billion from the end of 2009. The new valuation, done three months later by a member of both the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors, was 57% higher, although mall rents had only gone up 6.7% in the previous year and office rents had gone up just 1.9%. It all looks suspicious when the distribution of a huge revaluation surplus is dependent on such a high valuation.

The last DTZ valuation from October 31, 2010 explained the big increase in value to RMB 20 billion from RMB 11.2 billion as the result of declining capitalization (yield) rates, with the yield rate on The Malls moving down from 10.5% to 8% and the yield rate on The Offices moving down from 9% to 7%. The new valuation by American Appraisal China, on the other hand, applies even lower but contradictory yield rates, with the report stating that the respective yield rates on The Malls and The Offices as 6% and 5.5%, but the Valuation Certificate stating yield rates as 5% for The Malls and 4.5% for The Offices, indicating some change of heart during the valuation assignment. The valuation report does not present evidence for a 4.5% yield rate for offices.

As a point of reference, the Japan Real Estate Institute's Global Real Estate Markets Survey of 105 firms, published in May 2011, indicated a prevailing yield rate of 7% for Beijing offices, 7.1% for the CBD, up from 6.5% six months previously and 6% one year before.

In addition, the decrease in yield rates alleged by the new valuer seems to be at odds with the Chinese government increasing interest rates 5 times in the last eight months. There is usually some correlation between yield rates and interest rates.

As for the Direct Comparison portion of the valuation report, I was surprised to find so much of the "comparable" data consisted of asking prices rather than closed prices.

Distribution of the Revaluation Surplus

This "pre-listing distribution" of "the revaluation surplus" is part of the debt that was retired by the proceeds of the IPO. This is what allowed the owners to pocket over $1 billion in phantom capital gains immediately prior to public trading.


If Superman is reducing his stake in Hui Xian, why should we be buying?

One advertised virtue of the offering was that it was the first yuan-denominated offering outside China, allowing Hong Kong and offshore investors to invest yuan deposits that would otherwise yield lower returns in bank interest or in “dim sum bonds”. The anticipated yield was 4.26%.

The offering was subscribed at RMB 5.24 per share, but plunged 10% on the first day of trading in April. The last trade on July 5th was RMB 4.69, about 10.5% below the original offering price.

As of March 31, 2011, all seemed to be well at Oriental Plaza. Occupancy was reported as follows:

Retail mall 100%
Offices 99.7%
Apartments 95.4%
Grand Hyatt 72.9% (a good hotel occupancy rate)

The IPO prospectus only had financials until October 31, 2010. For the first 10 months of 2010 compared to the first 10 months of 2009, revenues were up for the malls and the hotel but office revenues decreased from RMB 563 million to RMB 542 million and apartment revenues declined from RMB 82 million to RMB 74 million. Overall revenues were up, nevertheless.

Headwinds?

Perhaps someone at Hui Xian Holdings saw strong headwinds coming their way. For instance, Years 2011 and 2012 will have numerous tenancy expirations, including more than 99% of the office tenants, 67.4% of the retail tenants, and more than 99% of the apartment tenants.

Also, despite double digit growth in retail sales, the amount of retail space inventory has been increasing even faster in Beijing, and the local retail vacancy rate was last measured at 24%, although it is a much lower 7.52% in the Dongcheng district that contains Oriental Plaza. In the last 3 quarters of 2010, added new supply was about three times absorption (also known as “take-up”). So far, this has not affected the Malls at Oriental Plaza (completed in year 2000), which enjoy an unparalleled location in a prime tourist and office area.

Still, the forecast is for 1,249,000 square meters (13.445 million square feet) of new high-end retail space to be completed in Beijing during the next two years, including the following new retail properties in the Dongcheng district:

Project
Wangfujing International Shopping Mall 40,000 sq mtrs 430,570 sf
Beijing Gong Project 46,000 sq mtrs 495,000 sf
Macao Center 23,000 sq mtrs 247,578 sf
Wangfujing International Brand Center 70,000 sq mtrs 753,500 sf

Oversupply is always bound to hurt even the best retail properties.

As for office space in Central Beijing, the growth in demand has recently exceeded the growth in supply, with the vacancy rate declining into single digits and average rents of $29.35 psf per year in U.S. dollars.

There are other Class A office projects in the works in Beijing, however:

Project
CITIC Securities Plaza 70,000 sq mtrs 750,000 sf
Xidan Yinzuo Centre 80,000 sq mtrs 860,000 sf
Meisheng International Plaza 43,000 sq mtrs 462,000 sf
Parkview Green 80,000 sq mtrs 860,000 sf
Guosheng Center 140,000 sq mtrs 1,500,000 sf
Fortune Plaza Phase III 150,000 sq mtrs 1,615,000 sf
Aether Square 50,000 sq mtrs 538,000 sf

As for the Dongcheng District, the nearby new supply will not be directly competitive. The difference between the Dongcheng district and the central business district seems much like the difference between the Chicago CBD and its Magnificent Mile, considering that Dongcheng is situated next to the premier Wangfujing retail district in Beijing. My hotel in Dongcheng was near a Bentley dealer, for instance.

There is nothing to suggest that Oriental Plaza is suffering any problems at the moment, but the fact that “Superman” Li is reducing his stake and cashing out a “revaluation surplus” should not be an encouraging sign to investors. Considering that Oriental Plaza was valued at RMB 31,410,000,000 but market capitalization of the trust was never that high and has now declined to RMB 23,550,000,000, perhaps that imaginary RMB 7.3 billion revaluation surplus should be returned to investors.

Disclosure: I have no short or long position in this stock.