The Important Synergy of Being Both a Certified Fraud Examiner and a Commercial Appraiser

Harry Markopolos, CFE, testifying before U.S. Congress

Some readers have noticed the CFE credential placed after my name. It stands for “Certified Fraud Examiner”, a designation earned from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners requiring testing in accounting, law, criminology and investigative techniques. This once-obscure designation became better known with the media attention on Harry Markopolos, a Certified Fraud Examiner who tried for 8 years to alert the SEC (US Securities and Exchange Commission) to the fraudulent Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme and who later testified before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee on the negligence of the SEC. He was interviewed on CBS Sixty Minutes by Steve Kroft and has his own book, No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller.

Most CFEs are also CPAs (certified public accountants) and thus concentrate on forensic accounting matters not related to real estate. I know of no other CFE who is also a commercial appraiser, which is a shame, because it would be foolish to think that fraud is not present in the commercial real estate industry. I specifically pursued this credential because I witness so much fraud in the commercial real estate business, and I also work with attorneys pursuing fraud complaints.

Most of my work, though, is for private lenders, and the emphasis is on fraud prevention. Private lenders are usually lenders of last resort and therefore attract some desperate loan applicants. My job is to not only value the property, but also detect misrepresentations and verify essential facts about the property and the borrower before a loan is made. This is how I got involved in appraising internationally, because international transactions bear a higher risk of fraud, and some private lenders are brave enough to venture into this area.

I also perform pro bono consulting work for swindled real estate investors, mainly because they've already lost all of their money and can't afford to pay me, but asset recovery is elusive when the swindlers are allowed to declare bankruptcy while hiding assets.  The victims are all senior citizens, which saddens me when I pause to consider how many thousands of people employed in the financial services industry work towards cheating people who spent their entire lives in honest careers and expected secure retirements.  Nevertheless, I continue to explore asset recovery strategies for these aggrieved investors.   

My CFE education has also improved my real estate valuation practice in several ways:

1. Greater ability to detect inaccurate financial statements,
2. Knowing resources for investigating buyers, sellers and borrowers, including hidden relationships,
3. Knowing how to interview buyers, sellers and borrowers in order to spot contradictions and obtain more honest information, an area of knowledge I call "deception science",
4. Learning how to better serve attorneys,
5. Learning how to testify in court, and
6. Understanding the psychology of deceit.

Let me provide some examples relating to each:

1. I easily determined that an Indian hotel owner had provided false income and expense statements because all line items had been increased at the exact same percentage over the previous year, which is a statistical impossibility.

2. I am constantly preventing commercial mortgage frauds in which properties are being purchased at inflated prices by supposedly independent parties who are actually the sellers themselves or related parties. These inflated prices were being used to request loans which were greater than the values of the properties serving as underlying collateral.

3. I like to get the property owner to confirm essential facts just in case their representation of facts changes. In Mexico City, I confirmed a property’s zoning with the managing co-owner, by saying “I see from the zoning that you can build up to 100 homes on this site” to which he responded “Yes, but even after considerable site development we would only be able to build about 80 because of the topography”. Not surprisingly, I was contacted by the lender-client several months later to be asked why my estimate of value was only 5% of the value estimated by the Cushman and Wakefield Valuation and Advisory office in Mexico City. Their appraised value was based on zoning that allowed 1500 homes to be built there. Forced into a conference call with the Mexican appraisers and my client, I asked, “What made you think that this site was zoned for 1500 homes?” Their answer was “The broker told us so.” A recheck with the zoning office confirmed that zoning had not changed, only the borrower’s story. This further confirms my low opinion of Cushman and Wakefield appraisers. See http://www.internationalappraiser.com/2011/05/warning-about-international-real-estate.html and http://www.internationalappraiser.com/2011/06/gibson-v-credit-suisse-mother-of-all.html . Are they about to become the Arthur Andersen of the real estate valuation profession?

Being a CFE has also gained me access to the scholarly research in the area of deception, including research done by Harvard Business School.  Researchers, for instance, have catalogued linguistic differences between liars and truth tellers, much like some of the lessons taught in the former Lie to Me television series, starring Tim Roth, which was based on the real-life research of Paul Ekman, a University of California professor.  For instance, liars tend to be more loquacious than truth tellers, as they require more words to make their deceptions convincing.  This is called the Pinocchio Effect, as the number of words grows longer as does Pinocchio's nose does. They also use more third person pronouns, a phenomenon known as distancing.  They also use more profanity in their oral communications.  For instance, "I swear to God, Vern -- this project has generated more excitement than any other in the history of my country."  (The phrases "excitement is building", "poised to sell out" and "potential for explosive growth" are all phrases I consider to be evasive.  I prefer to hear real numbers such as "90% pre-sold with 50% down payments" or "number of households has doubled in the last decade" and then receive documentation supporting these statements.)

4. For instance, I encourage the attorney to get me the opposing side’s supporting appraisal reports right away so that I can prepare insightful questions for them to ask in their subsequent deposition of the appraiser. When the dishonest appraiser crumbles in the deposition, the case can be settled more quickly.

5. Some of the things I’ve learned from ACFE about testifying include a) always tell the truth, b) try to provide only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers when being questioned by the opposing attorney, because the more one speaks, the more one can have his words used against him, and c) do not pretend to know more than the facts and analysis have revealed to me. Opposing attorneys, for instance, like to ask me “What if?” questions that would take me from the realm of what really happened to the realm of conjecture and hypothesis.

6. Fraud criminologists contend that fraud starts with a financial burden being experienced by the fraudster. In real estate, that often means a property experiencing negative cash flow or a property that is failing to attract interested tenants (in the case of developed properties) or builders or buyers (in the case of land). The fraud then happens when there is a perceived opportunity to relieve this burden (such as a naïve lender or a naïve group of investors). The final step is to rationalize the fraud, which in the real estate industry, is often the simple bromide “Everyone’s doing it”.

In discussing the problem of fraud with my professional peers, I find them divided into three camps:

1. Those who deny that it is happening.
2. Those who know it is happening, but do not think it is their responsibility to stop it.
3. Those who think it is also a problem, and make some efforts to prevent it.

An appraisal or valuation is worthless if it is based on false information.  It disturbs me that there are high-level members of the appraiser/valuer profession who think differently, people who see an appraisal analysis as an academic exercise based on suppositions.  These are people who think that an appraisal report is a good report even if the estimate of value proves to be erroneous.  They can justify faulty reports with a section entitled Assumptions and Limiting Conditions.

In summary, some instruction on fraud prevention should be part of every appraiser or valuer’s professional education. Let me also take this opportunity to plug my book (published by the Appraisal Institute), Fraud Prevention for Commercial Real Estate Valuation. See sidebar.

Gibson v. Credit Suisse: The Mother of All Syndication Frauds?

Previous blog posts have discussed deceptive real estate syndications.  

The mother of all alleged syndication frauds is the Credit Suisse loan syndication program involving 14 U.S. resorts. A syndicated loan is a loan sold off to multiple investors. I became obliquely involved when I appraised the property of one of the resort developers as additional loan collateral. (I have no relationship with Credit Suisse or Cushman & Wakefield.)

The alleged loan fraud is described by Bankruptcy Court Judge Ralph Kirschner as follows:

“In 2005, Credit Suisse was offering a new product for sale. It was offering the owners [developers] of luxury second-home developments the opportunity to take their profits up front by mortgaging their development projects to the hilt. Credit Suisse would loan the money on a non-recourse basis, earn a substantial fee, and sell off most of the credit to loan participants. The development owners would take most of the money out as a profit dividend, leaving their developments saddled with enormous debt. Credit Suisse and the development owners would benefit, while their developments—and especially the creditors of their developments—bore all the risk of loss. This newly developed syndicated loan product enriched Credit Suisse, its employees and more than one luxury development owner, but it left the developments too thinly capitalized to survive. Numerous entities that received Credit Suisse’s syndicated loan product have failed financially, including Tamarack Resort, Promontory, Lake Las Vegas, Turtle Bay and Ginn [Sur Mer].”

What makes this alleged fraud interesting to the International Appraiser is that Credit Suisse is Switzerland’s second largest bank and allegedly created a fake Cayman Islands branch in order to get around U.S. banking laws, particularly FIRREA (Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989).

Credit Suisse and Cushman & Wakefield Appraisal are currently co-defendants in three class actions lawsuits, claiming over $10 billion, over the loan defaults of all 14 resorts, as follows:

1. $8 billion alleged damages. Property owners v. lender and appraisal firm. Filed January 2010.
2. $2 billion alleged damages. Borrower v. lender, appraisal firm and appraiser. Filed February 2012.
3. $250 million alleged damages. . Hedge fund loan investors v. appraisal firm. Filed October 2011.

The plaintiffs in the first lawsuit contend that CS saddled the resorts with debts much higher than the underlying real estate values, thereby forcing bankruptcies that impaired the value of the real estate holdings of the individual residents. Such a loan is sometimes called a “predatory loan” and the scheme sometimes called “loan to own”. As a former banker, I find such a complaint to be hard to believe. Foreclosures are rarely profitable for banks.

Credit Suisse hired the appraisal firm Cushman & Wakefield to appraise each resort according to an unorthodox methodology named “Total Net Value,” which basically ignored the time value of money in estimating the present value of each of these resort developments. Such developments were going to take years to sell out, but future revenues were not discounted for time. The “total net value” (TNV) methodology was tantamount to creating discounted cash flow models with 0% discount rates. Its sole purpose seemed to be to inflate the appraised value and thus justify a higher loan amount.

The appraisal firm performed the appraisals according the Total Net Value methodology dictated to them by the lender and attempted to cover themselves with all the necessary disclosures and Assumptions and Limiting Conditions in their reports. Others mistakenly thought that the appraisals were market value appraisals, and it appears that CS wanted to create that illusion. Cushman even mailed the appraisal reports to the Cayman Islands address, ostensibly to circumvent U.S. appraisal laws.

All 14 syndicated loans failed and property owners at four failed resorts, Yellowstone Club, Tamarack Club in Idaho, Lake Las Vegas, and Ginn Sur Mer in the Bahamas, filed the first suit against CS and the appraisal firm, claiming that CS had defrauded them with a predatory “loan to own” scheme, that appraisers had used the total net value methodology to create misleading and deceptive appraisal reports that violate FIRREA, and that the defendants, knowing this, engaged in a conspiracy to circumvent FIRREA by creating a special purpose lending entity in the Cayman Islands and having the appraisal reports delivered there. The CS Cayman branch was alleged to be a post office box.

In its motion to dismiss, the appraisal firm claimed that the plaintiffs were aware that the appraisal reports properly disclosed that they were not based on market value. They also pointed out that there was no connection between the plaintiffs and the appraisers and thus no basis for privity (fiduciary responsibility). The motion to dismiss, interestingly enough, also states that the appraisals’ non-compliance with U.S. banking laws was irrelevant to any of the loans because the lender was from the Cayman Islands. How convenient.

The Yellowstone Club example illustrates the magnitude of appraised value inflation as a result of the TNV methodology. Yellowstone Club is a private vacation home community in Montana that includes such notable residents as Bill Gates and Dan Quayle. Prior to CS’s involvement, the same appraisal firm had appraised Yellowstone Club for $420 million. CS instructed the appraisers to revalue Yellowstone Club several months later using “total net value” methodology, and the appraised value shot up to $1,165,000,000, supporting a $375 million loan decision by Credit Suisse. The loan later went into default and foreclosure.

On July 17th, 2009, the foreclosed Yellowstone Club was sold for $115 million to Cross Harbor Capital Partners. The loan loss was therefore about $260 million.

Lessons to be learned

From the standpoint of international investors, there should be the fundamental realization that appraisal or valuation reports ordered by a syndication sponsor are not “independent valuation reports”, as they are often labeled. Allowing syndication sponsors to buy and pay for valuation reports is just placing foxes in charge of the hen house.

The U.S. certainly has laws against appraiser misconduct, but enforcement is rare, and was certainly not enough to prevent the greatest global financial crisis since the 1930s, which was due in large part to massive mortgage fraud enabled by appraisal fraud. What’s worse is that most other countries do not even have laws as strict as the U.S., which implemented tougher laws after the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s.

Some appraisers may think that certain liberties can be taken in an appraisal report as long as they are disclosed in the report. Appraisers may agree among themselves on what these types of disclosures are, but those outside the appraisal profession may not understand disclosures when they see them. This particular case may test the limits of how far this possibly undue reliance on disclaimers can go.

The appraisal reports for CS were previously published on the Internet and contained standard disclosures, disclaimers and Assumptions and Limiting Conditions. The “intended use” was for loan underwriting and the “intended user” was CS. An appraiser reading these reports could reasonably infer that the appraised values were not labeled as or intended to represent market values. The first plaintiffs in this case would not normally be considered to have a claim based on privity [duty of care to the plaintiff], either. Nevertheless, the appraisal firm is still facing an $8 billion lawsuit after an unsuccessful motion to dismiss.

The current judge on the case has raised the question of whether the plaintiffs properly understood the reports or had such capability. This raises the questions of whether disclosures and Assumptions and Limiting Conditions are enough to prevent the public from being misled. Appraisers should consider that any number printed as “appraised value” is likely to be interpreted by others as an expression of market value. There are many persons, particularly investors, who may rely on an “appraised value” without reading the report and finding the disclosures. Some properties or projects are even marketed with representations of appraised value without ever allowing the public to see the supporting appraisal reports, as was the case with Credit Suisse.

Large firms, in this case an international brokerage and appraisal firm, have deep pockets that can serve as a target for lawsuits. It would be in such a firm’s best interest to avoid all situations allowing accusations of impropriety. In this case, the reason for the using Total Net Value methodology instead of market value was not explained, making it seem that TNV’s sole purpose was to inflate the appraised value. This may make the appraisers seem complicit in the alleged loan fraud by CS, which the appraisals enabled. It is questionable if the appraisers expected to be part of a syndicated loan fraud scheme, though, as the only benefit to them were the fees earned for the reports. Nevertheless, whistleblower Michael Miller at C&W has come forward with allegations and incriminating e-mail messages (such as “not in jail yet and continuing to write these appraisals”) indicating that his colleagues knew they were creating misleading reports.

Congratulations to Cushman are in order for their award of a large "Financial Advisory Valuation Services" contract by the FDIC. Who says that excellence does not go unrewarded?

Final suggestion

Here is a suggestion for investors: Order your own appraisal or at least hire an appraiser to review the “independent valuation.” American Property Research provides such a service.